




A person is holding a protest sign made of cardboard. The sign has the words "There is" in blue paint at the top, "NO" in large blue letters in the middle, and "Planet B" in blue letters at the bottom. A thick red horizontal line is painted across the bottom of the sign, underlining the words "Planet B". The background is a blurred crowd of people at a protest, with a yellow circular object visible on the left.

Climate policy is not fiscal policy: understanding attitudes towards climate policy


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Addressing **climate change** is one of the most **significant societal challenges** of our time

**There are very
real consequences of
inaction**



And there is a reaction by policy makers



Most people still think **their national governments are not doing enough**

67% European average and **79% in Portugal**¹

... there is also the perception that climate policies are not popular

(fears of political backlash)

¹Source: European Commission. (2023). Special Eurobarometer 538: Climate change. Publications Office of the European Union. <https://doi.org/10.2834/096064>



Yellow Vests Movement, December 2018

O Executivo aproveitou a queda dos preços dos combustíveis que se perspectiva para a próxima semana para avançar com a reversão parcial dos “descontos” no ISP que vigoram desde 2022. Um abastecimento de 30 litros de gásóleo irá entregar ao Estado mais 72 centimos em ISP

28 NOVEMBRO 2025 23:53

Source: Expresso. (2025, November 28). Governo aumenta ISP da gasolina em 1,6 centimos por litro e o do gásóleo em 2,4 centimos. Expresso.

What **drives support** for climate policies?

- 01** Personal characteristics
- 02** Climate change assessment
- 03** Ideology and trust in political institutions
- 04** Self-interest
- 05** Policy-specific beliefs
- 06** Design of the climate policy

About the data

- 1st wave of CRONOS2 (after the 10th round of the ESS)
- Data collected from **April 1st to September 29th, 2022**
- 18 years old and above, residing in private households, with **internet access**
- **6,030 individuals from 11 countries**
- **Randomised controlled trial**
- Respondents are randomly assigned to treatments and control groups

About the data (summary statistics)

	EU	Austria	Belgium	Czechia	Finland	France	Iceland	Italy	Portugal	Slovenia	Sweden	UK
Women	51%	46%	51%	57%	53%	54%	49%	46%	55%	51%	49%	54%
Age												
18-34	28%	32%	26%	23%	24%	29%	30%	36%	32%	30%	27%	25%
35-49	26%	22%	28%	28%	26%	27%	27%	22%	31%	31%	26%	21%
50+	45%	46%	45%	49%	50%	44%	42%	42%	37%	39%	47%	54%
College Ed	38%	34%	39%	19%	45%	38%	37%	18%	32%	39%	39%	53%
Unemployed	4%	1%	3%	5%	4%	4%	4%	7%	8%	5%	4%	5%
Ideology												
Left	35%	43%	29%	25%	31%	32%	40%	35%	32%	30%	41%	36%
Centre	36%	43%	45%	41%	33%	37%	31%	28%	36%	44%	25%	41%
Right	24%	13%	23%	24%	34%	25%	24%	18%	22%	15%	33%	19%

About the data (summary statistics)

Avaliações de alterações climáticas

	Áustria	Bélgica	Chéquia	Finlândia	França	Islândia	Itália	Portugal	Eslovénia	Suécia	Reino Unido
Conhecimento sobre alterações climáticas	72%	58%	42%	63%	60%	59%	67%	49%	44%	70%	53%
Preocupado com as alterações climáticas	57%	47%	38%	38%	42%	35%	46%	64%	51%	34%	47%
Sente-se pessoalmente responsável	41%	39%	12%	54%	63%	51%	41%	55%	45%	42%	53%

Confiança nas instituições

Não confia nos funcionários públicos	20%	13%	27%	6%	11%	6%	16%	9%	25%	6%	15%
Não confia no governo nacional	40%	30%	52%	8%	32%	20%	45%	23%	61%	16%	49%
É improvável que consiga influenciar qualquer decisão na sua área de residência	39%	34%	38%	23%	63%	34%	36%	36%	32%	29%	44%
Aplicação injusta de benefícios/serviços públicos	13%	15%	27%	8%	29%	14%	30%	30%	21%	9%	21%

Eficácia da política climática

Irá reduzir o emprego/prejudicar a economia	38%	43%	60%	42%	40%	24%	39%	53%	52%	29%	37%
Irá pôr o próprio emprego em risco	29%	44%	49%	32%	47%	23%	53%	54%	45%	29%	35%
Irá fazer subir os preços da energia	92%	83%	88%	93%	83%	84%	63%	80%	83%	87%	80%
Proporcionará uma vida melhor para as gerações futuras	82%	76%	59%	82%	78%	74%	84%	85%	84%	73%	81%
Irá melhorar a saúde	80%	74%	56%	73%	80%	77%	85%	86%	84%	72%	80%

How do we assess it?

***Fossil fuel
taxes***

***Plastic
packaging
tax***

***Taxes on
imports***

***Ban
energy-
inefficient
appliances***

***Renewable
energy
subsidies***

***Support
for
workers***

What do we do?

$$Support_{i,p} = \rho_0 + \theta'Treatment_{i,h,p} + \alpha'X_i + \beta'Z_i + \gamma'W_i + Country_i + \varepsilon_{i,p}$$

$Support_{i,p}$ represents a dummy that is equal to 1 when individual i supports policy p

$Treatment_{i,h,p}$ is equal to 1 if the respondent i was subject to treatment h and zero otherwise

X_i comprises socioeconomic characteristics: gender, age group, education level, and employment status


Z_i captures climate change evaluations (knowledge and worry of climate change and personal accountability)

W_i measures political ideology, trust in institutions and beliefs about climate policies

$Country_i$ captures country fixed effects

$\varepsilon_{i,p}$ is the error term

Results Results



Other factors affecting support?

(correlations only)

- **Female, younger, non-college educated** and unemployed respondents are, where statistically different from zero, **less supportive** of climate policies.
- Climate change **evaluations, knowledge** (i.e. recognizing that climate change is mostly due to human action), **concern** and sense of personal **responsibility** to act are all **positively associated with support** for all climate policies.
- Among ideology, trust and **beliefs about climate policies effectiveness**, the latter is the most important for understanding support.

A word on the indifferents

Strict definition of support

Those that are "neither in favour nor against" are **16% to 27%** of our respondents

Who are they?

- Women and those without a college degree are more likely to be indifferent.
- Younger voters are more likely to be indifferent for some of the policies considered, as are those at the center of the political spectrum.
- Lower concern about climate change, less knowledge, lower sense of personal responsibility or higher distrust also correlated with lack of opinion.
- Policy effectiveness perceptions are not, in general, associated with indifference, except for fears about own job (those that express a concern are more likely to be indifferent).

These voters **may be critical to achieve a supporting majority!**

What can we conclude?

1. We show the importance of design features, namely relating to funding options and the overall tax burden
→ support is boosted if climate policies do not increase the tax burden
2. We also show that individual perceptions on climate change and climate policies are significantly associated with support → provides scope for government action also in this front
3. We shed light on who are indifferent voters → given the important share of indifferent voters, targeted information campaigns may boost further support further

Taken together, these factors can be enough to sustain a supporting majority for all policies considered

Limitations and way forward

- Dataset does not account for the size of the climate tax or the subsidy, nor to incremental changes
- Deeper understanding of financing and earmarking options would bring additional insights
- On earmarking, dataset focuses on unrelated targets (like the unemployed or the elderly)
- Inclusion of additional climate policies – e.g. energy efficiency of buildings or mobility
- Within country regional breakdown is only available at a very aggregated level
- Dataset lacked information on lifestyle and self interest
- Perceived effectiveness of climate policies was measured as an overall perception rather than for each specific policy

THANK YOU!